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1. Introduction
Which Nash equilibria in coordination games (hereafter CG) would emerge in the
long run has been intensively studied in the literature of evolutionary games. Risk-
dominant equilibria are predicted by many works (e.g., Blume (1993, 1995), Ellison
(1993), Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993), Sandholm (1998)). Under imitation
dynamics and local interaction, Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006) show that risk-
dominant equilibria survive uniquely in the long run when players interact with their
immediate neighbors only. But payo-dominant equilibria will be selected when play-
ers' interactions are neither global nor limited to their immediate neighbors. In Al os-
Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006), it is assumed that risk-dominant equilibria are not
Pareto ecient. Here we revisit Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer's (2006) model but un-
der the assumption that risk-dominant equilibria are Pareto ecient. We nd that
risk-dominant equilibria, non-risk-dominant equilibria, and some non-monomorphic
states all can emerge in the long run when players interact with their immediate neigh-
bors only. The intuition is simple. When risk-dominant equilibria are not Pareto
ecient, payo-dominant-strategy takers can clump together and expand. Then, it
is costly for risk-dominant equilibria to jump out of their basin of attraction such
that they survive uniquely. In contrast, if risk-dominant equilibria are Pareto ecient,
the expansion force of non-risk-dominant strategy takers is weakened. Then, it is less
costly for risk-dominant equilibria to jump out of their basin of attraction so that some
non-monomorphic states can survive as well.
2. The Model and Results
Let N = f1; 2;:::;ng; n  5; be the set of players. Players are assumed to
sit sequentially and equally spaced around a circle. Each individual has exactly two
neighbors. For i 2 N, let Ni = fi   1; i + 1g be the set of player i's neighbors. At
each time period t 2 f1; 2; 3;:::g; players meet each of their two neighbors once to
play 2  2 symmetric CG below.
A B
A a, a b, c
B c, b d, d
where a > c and d > b such that both (A; A) and (B; B) are strict Nash equilibria.
Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006) further assume that d > a and a + b > c + d so
that (A; A) is risk dominant and (B; B) is Pareto ecient. Here we assume that a  d
and a+b > c+d so that (A; A) is both Pareto ecient and risk-dominant, and (B; B)
is non-risk-dominant. As in Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006), we normalize the
above game as




where  = c b
a b and  = d b
a b. Hence,
 < 1; 0 <   1 and  +  < 1: (1)
Our state space S  fA; BgN is a set containing all players' strategy proles.
Denote ~ A = (A; A;:::;A) and ~ B = (B; B;:::;B) the states in which all players take
strategies A and B; respectively. At the beginning of each period, players' actions and
payos occured (after revision) in the last period are observable to their neighbors. And
players are assumed to imitate the strategies earning the highest total payo among
their neighbors and themselves. Given state ~ s = (s1; s2;:::;sn) 2 S, let zi(~ s) be player




i (~ s) if si = A;
  nA
i (~ s) +   (2   nA
i (~ s)) if si = B;
where nA
i (~ s) = jfj 2 Ni : sj = Agj is the number of player i's neighbors taking strategy
A: Then, player i's next-period rational choice, ri(~ s); will satisfy
ri(~ s) 2 arg max
j2Ni[fig
zj(~ s): (2)
Whenever there is a tie, strategy A or B will be taken with strictly positive probability.
At the end of each period, all players are allowed to revise their rational choices with
probability  > 0: For xed ; our dynamic system is a Markov chain on S: Let Q0
and Q be the transition probability matrices for the rational and revised processes
respectively. Dene r(~ s) = (r1(~ s);:::;rn(~ s)). Being a perturbation of Q0, we have
Q(~ s;~ u)  constant  U(~ s;~ u) for any ~ s;~ u 2 S, where U(~ s;~ u) = minr(~ s) d(r(~ s);~ u) and
d(r(~ s);~ u) = jfi 2 N : ri(~ s) 6= uigj counts the total number of player i revising his
rational choice ri(~ s) at state ~ s.
Because Q(~ s;~ u) > 0 for all ~ s;~ u 2 S; the revision makes our dynamic system
fXtg ergodic. Let  be the associated unique invariant distribution under Q. We
are interested in the limit probability distribution 
def = lim!0  and its support
S  f~ s 2 S : (~ s) > 0g: Each element in S is called a long run equilibrium
(hereafter LRE). A non-monomorphic state consists of A-strings alternating with equal
number of B-strings since all players sit around a circle as follows.
AA | {z }
ak
B B | {z }
bk
AA | {z }
a1
B B | {z }
b1
AA | {z }
a2
B B | {z }
b2
; (3)
where ai;bi are the lengths of its i-th A-string and B-string respectively. Let Mm; p
def =
f~ s 2 S : all ai  m and bj = p in (3)g consisting of non-monomorphic states with
all A-strings of length  m and all B-strings of length p: The LREs of our dynamic
system are given below.
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Theorem 1: Under the imitation rule (2), S = f~ Ag except the following two cases:
(i) When  > 1=2; S = f~ Bg if 5  n  6, S = f~ A; ~ Bg [ M3; 1 if 7  n  12; and
S = f~ Ag [ M3; 1 if n  13:
(ii) When  = 1=2; S = f~ A; ~ Bg if 5  n  6; and S = f~ Ag if n  7:
Proof. See the Appendix A.
Theorem 1 shows that risk-dominant equilibria, non-risk-dominant equilibria, and
some non-monomorphic states can be LREs. The payo structure and population size
determine which equilibria will emerge in the long run. For large population, risk-
dominant equilibrium ~ A is in favor. This is no wonder. But it is not the unique LRE
as shown by Theorem 1(i). Due to the space limit, we provide the intuition of Theorem
1(i) below.
Since S  S0 (i.e., the set of all ergodic states under Q0), the rst step is to
determine S0. Certainly, f~ A; ~ Bg  S0. Moreover, all non-monomorphic states in
M3; 1 are absorbing under Q0 as well. It is easy to check that
state ::: B A B B A A A B A A B B B :::
total payo ::: ::: 0  +   +  1 2 1 2 1 1  +  2 ::: :::
When  > 1=2, we have  >  and 2 < 1 by (1). Thus, a single A-player will change
to strategy B in the next period under Q0, while a single B-player will retain his
strategy in the next period i he is isolated or confronted with an isolated A-player.
Moreover, each string of A-player with length  3 can hold and expand until it is
surrounded by singleton B-players. Thus, M3; 1  S0: However, which of ~ A; ~ B and
M3; 1 are LREs are determined by which states can be reached from the others at the
minimum cost. Let ~ s0
k ! ~ s1 represent that state ~ s0 can reach state ~ s1 by k mutants,
and ~ s0
k $ ~ s1 indicates that state ~ s1 can reach ~ s0 by k mutants as well. Then, any two
states in f~ Ag [ M3; 1 can communicate with each other by a sequence of one-mutant
transitions because
  AA | {z }
3

B AA | {z }
3

1 $   A

A A | {z }
5
  and ~ A
1 $ AA | {z }
n 1
B:
Next, since an A-string with length 2 can grow until a single B left or ~ A reached,
the minimum cost from ~ B to any state in f~ Ag[M3; 1 is 2. In contrast, the minimum








0 ! ~ B
for n = 6: It means that ~ B is the unique LRE for n = 5; 6: However, for n  7;
the minimum-cost path to ~ B from states in f~ Ag [ M3; 1 must rst attain a non-
monomorphic state alternating A-strings with length 5 and B-strings with length 1.
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Then, by adding one mutant in the middle of each A-string of this state, the non-
monomorphic state will reach ~ B at zero cost, i.e.,


















0 !   B :::B | {z }
7
  :
Thus, the total of bn
6c mutants are needed if n is a multiple of 6. Otherwise, an extra
mutant is needed to eliminate the remaining block containing some A's. Accordingly,
dn
6e mutants are required to reach ~ B from states in f~ Ag [ M3; 1: Thus, the relative
sizes of 2 and dn
6e determine which stationary states are LREs. For 7  n  12; ~ A; ~ B;
and M3; 1 are all LREs, and f~ Ag [ M3; 1 will be the LREs for n  13:
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, under imitation dynamics, Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006)
show that selecting risk-dominant equilibria is sensitive to players' interacting ways.
Our results further demonstrate that the selection is sensitive to games' payo struc-
tures as well.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1. Only the case of  > 0 is considered, the rest can be treated
similarly. Ellison's (2000) Radius and Coradius Theorem is adopted when jSj = 1;
while the Freidlin-Wentzell Method (1984) is used when S is complicated as in case (i).
Since S  S0, the set of all ergodic states under Q0, the rst step is to determine S0.
Certainly, f~ A; ~ Bg  S0. Let M
def = S0 nf~ A; ~ Bg be the set of non-monomorphic ergodic
states. Using  > 0 and (1), we have 0 = minf1;0;;g < 1 = maxf1;0;;g. Since
ri(~ s) depends only on the strategies (si 2;si 1;si;si+1;si+2) taken by ve consecutive
players from i   2 to i + 2 and are independent of the time t and the label of player
i, we dene r(si 2;si 1;si;si+1;si+2)
def = ri(~ s) for brevity. Figure A in the Appendix B
implies that with  = A or B independently,
r(;B;A;B;) = B; (4)
which means that an isolated A-player would change to strategy B in the next period
under Q0: The following classications are used to determine other strategy-updating
rules under Q0.
Case (i)  > 1=2. For 2  1, we can use  +  < 1 in (1) to get  >  and 2 < 1.
Under Q0, we get from Figures B and BB that
r(;A;B;A;) = B; r(B;A;B;B;) = B and r(A;A;B;B;) = A: (5)
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Certainly, r(;B;B;A;B) = B and r(;B;B;A;A) = A by symmetry. Eq (5) means
that a B-player will keep his strategy B in the next period i he is isolated or confronted
with an isolated A-player. As to a non-isolated A-player, Figure AA shows that
r(A;B;A;A;B) = B and r(;B;A;A;A) = r(B;B;A;A;B) = A: (6)
Using (4)-(6) and the denition of S0, we have observations as follows:
(O1) If ~ s 2 M and ~ t is reachable from ~ s under Q0, then ~ t is ergodic as well.
(O2) Any A-string with length  3 can hold and grow until it is surrounded by
singleton B-strings, which can hold under Q0. In particular, M3; 1  M.
(O3) A singleton A-string will be absorbed into a larger B-string under Q0 and the
singleton A will not be recovered afterwards. Hence, ai  2 for all ~ s 2 M.
(O4) Since ai  2 for all ~ s 2 M by (O3), any B-string with length  2 in ~ s 2 M
will shrink until it disappears or becomes a singleton. Note that the length of any its
neighboring A-strings does not decrease in the process. When encountered by some
A-string of length 2, a singleton B-string could expand under Q0 to length 2 or 3 in
the next period. By (O1) and (O3), it will disappear in the next period under Q0 in
the former case. In the latter case it will shrink back to be singleton under Q0. Hence,
bi = 1 or 3 for all ~ s 2 M.
(O5) Any A-string of length 2 will be eliminated in the next period when surrounded
by singleton B-strings. By (O2) and (O4), we deduce that if ~ s 2 M has some A-string
with length  3; then ~ s 2 M3; 1.
(O6) Let M = M n M3; 1. By (O5), all ai = 2 for ~ s 2 M. Using (O2) and
(O4) again, two successive B-strings in ~ s must have length 1 and 3 respectively. Say,
bi 1 = 3 and bi = 1. Because ai 1 = ai+1 = 2, the same argument shows bi 2 = 1 and
bi+1 = 3. Repeating over and over, we conclude that if exists, any ~ s 2 M must have













A ABB | {z }
repeat n
8times
 = ~ s0: (7)
Hereafter, ~ u
c ! ~ v means U(~ u;~ v) = c and ~ u
c $ ~ v means U(~ v;~ u) = c as well. It follows
from (7) that M 6= ; i 8jn.
Next, we need to nd v(~ s), the minimum cost among all spanning trees rooted at
~ s. Certainly, only ~ s 2 S0 needs to be considered. Write M3;1 = [k1Mk, where k is
the number of A-strings in representation (3) for ~ s.
Step 1. For convenience, dene M0 = f~ Ag. The following diagram shows that any























Since jM0j = 1, (8) implies that all states in f~ Ag[M3; 1 can reach any ~ s 2 f~ Ag[M3; 1
at cost 1 for each state. So, the total cost is jM3; 1j.
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Step 2. By (4)-(6), the most economical path for ~ B to reach f~ Ag[M3;1 is as follows.
Depending on whether 2jn or not, we get as in (O4) that
~ B




A BB  




A AB  
0 ! 
0 ! ~ A or AAAAAAB 2 M1:
Step 3. When 8jn, states ~ s; ~ s0 in (7) form an irreducible class under Q0 as Q0(~ s;~ s0) =
Q0(~ s0;~ s) = 1. The following path shows an optimal way for the class to reach out:
~ s0 0 $ ~ s = AAB

B BAAB | {z }
1 ! BAA

A AABB | {z }
0 ! AAA

A AAAB | {z }    
0 ! ~ A
as the newly formed A-string absorbs its neighboring B's until it reaches ~ A. Since jMj
=8, all states in M can reach ~ A at a minimum total cost of 8=2 = 4.
Step 4. When 8jn so M 6= ;, (O2) indicates that the following path is optimal to















B AAB | {z }
repeat n
8times
 = ~ w 2 M
: (9)
Step 5. We now nd an optimal path from f~ Ag [ M3; 1 to f~ Bg. To avoid A-strings
with length  3 which can hold under Q0 as shown in (O2), it saves to start from some
~ s 2 M3; 1 which has as many B's as possible. Moreover, it takes at least ` revisions
under Q to eliminate an A-string with length  3`+2 in ~ s 2 M3; 1. Since an A-string
in ~ s 2 M3; 1 needs at least one revision to be eliminated under Q, some calculation
shows that it is the most economical to have block BAAAAA duplicated in ~ s 2 M3; 1





times and that one revision is enough to eliminate






optimal choice for being both in M3; 1 and economical is ;;A;AA;AAA;BAAA and
BAAAA for r = 0;1;2;3;4 and 5 respectively. Of course, an extra mutation is needed































for 8jn, it is also an optimal path from f~ Ag [ M3; 1 to f~ Bg.





+ 4  f8jng and v(f~ sg) = jM3; 1j +






for ~ w 2 M. Since S = f~ s 2 S0 : v(~ s) = min~ w2S0 v(~ w)g by Theorems 4.1 in Chen and











> 2 and S = f~ Ag [ M3; 1.
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Case (ii)  = 1=2. All the updating rules in Case (i) remain valid except the rst
rules in both (5) and (6) are revised as follows:
0 < Prob(r(A;A;B;A;) = B) < 1 and 0 < Prob(r(A;B;A;A;B) = B) < 1:
Consequently, we have that, with positive probability under Q0,
(O7) an A-string with length  2 can hold and grow until it reaches ~ A.
By (4) and (5), any non-monomorphic state without an A-string of length  2
belongs to the basin of attraction of ~ B. Hence, S0 = f~ A; ~ Bg. By (4) and (O7), the
following path shows v(f~ Ag) = 2:
~ B




A BB  




A AB  
0 ! 
0 ! ~ A: (10)
Because we still have Prob(r(A;A;A;B;) = A) = 1, an A-string of length  3 should


























. Note that n  5 by assumption.
Case (iii)  < 1=2 and  < 1=2: While (4) remains valid, Figure BB implies
r(B;A;B;B;) = B; r(A;A;B;B;A) = A and r(A;A;B;B;B) = A (11)
under Q0. Moreover, Figures AA and B imply that a non-isolated A-player and an iso-
lated B-player would rationally update their strategies in the next period respectively
according to
r(;A;A;B;) = A; r(B;A;B;A;B) = B and r(A;A;B;A;) = A: (12)
The rst rule above and (11) imply that (O7) holds with probability 1 under Q0 .
Therefore, S0 = f~ A; ~ Bg as the basin of attraction at ~ B remains the same as that in
Case (ii). The path of (10) shows CR(f~ Ag) = 2. Because of (O7), an A-string of length
 2 should be avoided in order to escape from ~ A. Hence, R(f~ Ag)  3 > CR(f~ Ag).
The denitions of radius (R(~ s)) and coradius (CR(~ s)) at state ~ s can be found in Ellison
(2000). Then, by Ellison's (2000) Radius and Coradius Theorem, S = f~ Ag as claimed
in the theorem.
Case (iv)  < 1=2  . Similar to Case (i), we have  > : All updating rules
in Case (iii) remain valid, except that the last rule in (11) needs to be modied.
Depending on  = 1=2 or  > 1=2; we have 0 < Prob(r(A;A;B;B;B) = A) <
1 or Prob(r(A;A;B;B;B) = B) = 1: As in Case (iii), we have S = f~ Ag for  = 1=2:
For  > 1=2; Prob(r(A;A;B;B;B) = B) = 1 means that a B-string of length  3
can hold when surrounded by A-strings of length  2. By (O3) and (12), it is not
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dicult to show that M = M2;3. Write M2;3 = [k1Mk and dene M0 = f~ Ag as
in Case (i). By shrinking B-strings at the cost 1 of each move, any ~ s 2 Mk with k  1
can move within Mk and reach M2;3 as shown below:




B | {z }
bi3
AA | {z }
ai+1

1 $ A  A | {z }
ai
B  BB | {z }
bi 1





1 $ A  A | {z }
ai
BBB | {z }
3
A  A | {z }
ai+1+bi 3
:
Then by the second rule in (11),




B | {z }
3
AA | {z }
ai+12











A AA | {z }
ai+3+ai+1
 2 Mk 1:
Together with (10), this suggests that the modied coradius of ~ A is CR(f~ Ag) = 2.
Note that the state after ~ B in (10) is in M1. Since R(f~ Ag)  3 by the rst rule in (12),
S = f~ Ag as in Case (iii).
Appendix B
In Figures A, B, AA, BB, the state columns depict strategies adopted by ve consec-
utive players i   2; i   1; i; i + 1 and i + 2:
Figure A
State ~ s Total payos for players i   1;i; and i + 1
ABABA zi 1(~ s) = 2; zi(~ s) = 0; zi+1(~ s) = 2
ABABB  zi 1(~ s) = 2; zi(~ s) = 0; zi+1(~ s) =  + 
BBABB  zi 1(~ s) =  + ; zi(~ s) = 0; zi+1(~ s) =  + 
Figure B
State ~ s Total payos for players i   1;i; and i + 1
AABAA zi 1(~ s) = 1; zi(~ s) = 2; zi+1(~ s) = 1
AABAB  zi 1(~ s) = 1; zi(~ s) = 2; zi+1(~ s) = 0
BABAB  zi 1(~ s) = 0; zi(~ s) = 2; zi+1(~ s) = 0
Figure AA
State ~ s Total payos for players i   1;i; and i + 1
AAABA zi 1(~ s) = 2; zi(~ s) = 1; zi+1(~ s) = 2
AAABB  zi 1(~ s) = 2; zi(~ s) = 1; zi+1(~ s) =  + 
BAABA zi 1(~ s) = 1; zi(~ s) = 1; zi+1(~ s) = 2
BAABB  zi 1(~ s) = 1; zi(~ s) = 1; zi+1(~ s) =  + 
Figure BB
State ~ s Total payos for players i   1;i; and i + 1
AABBA zi 1(~ s) = 1; zi(~ s) =  + ; zi+1(~ s) =  + 
AABBB  zi 1(~ s) = 1; zi(~ s) =  + ; zi+1(~ s) = 2
BABBA zi 1(~ s) = 0; zi(~ s) =  + ; zi+1(~ s) =  + 
BABBB  zi 1(~ s) = 0; zi(~ s) =  + ; zi+1(~ s) = 2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